Americas Trade Friction
US-Mexico Dispute Over Chinese Transshipment
During the mandatory six-year joint review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the Trump administration is seeking to tighten restrictions on Chinese supply lines. U.S. officials argue that Canada and Mexico are violating the spirit, and potentially the letter, of the USMCA by enabling China to penetrate North American supply chains, particularly regarding Chinese-sourced critical minerals or software.
On August 23, 2026, an analysis by Oscar Ocampo, director of Economic Development of the Mexican Institute for Competitiveness (IMCO), published in response to the White House report "The Great Transshipment Scam" of August 13, indicated that 2025 trade data contradict the report's assertions accusing Mexico and other partners of triangulating Chinese goods to avoid U.S. tariffs. The data do not support the theory that Mexico functions as a relevant transshipment channel to evade U.S. tariffs on Chinese products.
During 2025, Mexico's exports to the U.S. reached a record of 534.9 billion dollars, an increase of 5.8% versus 2024 and a historic high, while purchases from China advanced to a lesser extent: for every additional dollar exported to the U.S., Mexico imported only 12 additional cents from China. In the machinery and computer equipment sector, for every dollar imported from China, Mexico exported 35 dollars to the U.S.
IMCO concludes that the growth in exports responds to demand for artificial intelligence infrastructure in the U.S., which has driven investments by Taiwanese companies such as Foxconn (with operations in Ciudad Juárez and Guadalajara), Inventec, Pegatron and Wistron on the Mexican border.
US-Canada Tariff Standoff
Following the collapse of last-minute U.S.-Canada tariff negotiations, the United States imposed 50% tariffs on approximately 20 billion dollars of Canadian goods. One account said that on August 22, 2026 the United States implemented the tariffs under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930; another said U.S. President Donald Trump's 50% tariffs went into effect at midnight on Saturday, August 22, 2026 (12:01 a.m. EDT Sunday, August 23, 2026); a further report said the new U.S. 50% tariffs on Canadian goods took effect on August 23, 2026. The tariffs cover products previously protected under the USMCA trade agreement. According to one account, they target goods such as wine, cement, hockey equipment, honey, paper, textiles, and some electronics, while potash, fish, energy, and certain critical minerals are exempt. Another account said they cover products such as automobiles, alcoholic beverages, and dairy, bypassing exemptions under the USMCA.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced that the talks failed on Friday night because the United States maintained a 25 percent automotive tariff on non-US content in vehicles made in Canada. Negotiators evaluated reducing it to 15 percent, but the U.S. refused to exempt medium and heavy trucks, such as those produced at the Ford plant in Toronto. In addition, the U.S. sought to limit Canada's commercial agreements with third countries and raised unacceptable demands regarding French culture and language. Carney announced "dollar-for-dollar" retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products, including steel, dairy, household appliances, agricultural equipment, pulp, paper, and electronics, starting September 8, 2026, equivalent to the U.S. 50% tariffs on about 20 billion dollars of Canadian imports. A separate report said Canada's Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and cabinet members announced immediate retaliatory tariffs of 25% on C$30 billion (20.7 billion dollars) of U.S. goods, potentially increasing to C$125 billion (86.2 billion dollars) if U.S. tariffs remain in place after 21 days.
Valeria Moy analyzed the implications of the collapse, highlighting that the United States resorted to this measure against a trading partner with which it recorded 376 billion dollars in bilateral trade in one semester. Moy warned that for the T-MEC review, Mexico's productive integration with the United States is deeper and less substitutable than Canada's, although the Trump administration has normalized a negotiation style based on threats in which existing agreements are treated as optional. An analysis of the USMCA and U.S. protectionism noted that the U.S. tariff action against Canada based on its third-country trade agreements represents a wake-up call and warning for Mexico, creating risks that Mexico could be targeted next under similar third-country challenges. Mexico maintains free trade agreements with the UK, the EU, the European Free Trade Association, Japan, CPTPP members, Transpacific Partnership members, the members of Latin America's Pacific Alliance, and others. Colin Robertson analyzed the collapse of Canada-U.S. tariff negotiations and urged Canada and Mexico to build a permanent strategic partnership to defend rules of origin under CUSMA/USMCA. He noted that the upcoming first anniversary of the partnership between Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum (established in Mexico City on September 19, 2025) should mark a shift where both countries coordinate closely, consult first, and align interests to resist Washington's efforts to turn parallel USMCA negotiations into a competition over who concedes more.
Other News
Panama Canal Restricts Daily Transits
The Panama Canal Authority is tightening transit operations under hydrological pressure from low rainfall and an intensifying El Niño event. Rainfall between May and August was approximately 34% below the historical average for this period.
From September 3, 2026, daily ship transits will be reduced to 34 from the current 36. From September 15, 2026, the number of allowed transits will further drop to 32 ships.
The authority also announced temporary modifications to transit and booking conditions. Effective August 21, 2026, for booking dates beginning September 4, the number of daily slots at the Neopanamax Locks will be reduced to nine (9). This change includes offering only one Neopanamax slot during Booking Period 2 and suspending the conditioned slot in this category.
The maximum authorized draft of 14.63 meters (48.0 feet) TFW, originally scheduled for August 26, has been postponed to September 2, 2026. The subsequent draft adjustment to 14.48 meters (47.5 feet) TFW has been postponed from September 3 to October 1, 2026.
Former Administrator of the Panama Canal, Jorge Luis Quijano, warned that November is the critical month that will determine whether the waterway enters another crisis, depending on reservoir recovery. Currently, Alhajuela Lake is at approximately 239 feet and Gatun Lake is at about 84.5 feet.
If the lakes are not sufficiently replenished by November, the Panama Canal Authority will have to resort to reducing ship drafts and further decreasing daily transits. Quijano explained that draft reductions primarily impact fully loaded container ships, which require 47 to 48 feet of draft, whereas cruise ships, car carriers, gas carriers, and unladen vessels generally do not need drafts exceeding 40 or 41 feet.
Middle East Oil Shipping Crisis
Iran Hormuz Blacklist and War Warning
On Sunday, August 23, 2026, Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) announced a new blacklist of foreign-flagged vessels accused of violating regulations governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz. The PGSA stated that these blacklisted ships could face future restrictions during transit, including fines, detention, seizure, or confiscation.
Since mid-March 2026, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has controlled the procedure for foreign vessels transiting Iranian waters, requiring inspections before granting transit clearance. Iranian authorities maintain that these requirements are payments for maritime services—including navigational assistance, vessel insurance, and environmental protection measures jointly implemented with Oman—rather than tariffs.
The same day, Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, warned that Iran will consider any state's participation in or support for the U.S. anti-Iran economic operation as an "act of war." Rezaei stated that if the economic war continues, no oil will be exported through the Strait of Hormuz or from anywhere in the Persian Gulf.
The warning responded to U.S. President Donald Trump's social media post announcing "the most crushing economic operation ever taken" against any country providing a lifeline to Iran, describing it as an "ECONOMIC D-DAY."
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Mexico Issues Final Anti-Dumping Ruling on Chinese Ammonium Sulfate and Imposes Duties
Mexico's Ministry of Economy issued a final anti-dumping ruling on ammonium sulfate (Spanish: sulfato de amonio) originating in China and decided to impose an anti-dumping duty of USD 0.1488 per kilogram.
The announcement was issued on August 14, 2026. The HS Code of the product under Mexico's tariff schedule (TIGIE) is 3102.21.01.
The anti-dumping duty measure takes effect from the day after the announcement was issued, that is August 15, 2026. Collection of the duty formally takes effect from the day after Mexico's Ministry of Economy issued the announcement.
On August 24, 2026, the Trade Remedy Investigation Bureau of China's Ministry of Commerce released information on the Mexican ruling.
Grupo Yazaki Labor Dispute Resolved Under USMCA
The United States and Mexico resolved the USMCA Rapid Response Labor Mechanism (RRM) case at the Grupo Yazaki, S.A. de C.V. facility in León, Guanajuato, Mexico.
The facility manufactures automotive wire harnesses and electronic components. The U.S. Department of Labor and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative announced the successful resolution.
The resolution restores U.S. tariff processing for the facility. The U.S. Trade Representative directed the Secretary of the Treasury to resume liquidation of unliquidated entries of goods from the facility. Ambassador Jamieson Greer directed the Department of the Treasury to resume the liquidation of suspended entries of goods from the facility.
Remediation actions at the facility include neutrality statements, a minority-union rights policy, worker training, and monitoring by the Mexican government. As part of the remediation, Yazaki agreed to issue a union neutrality statement and conduct worker training.
The case had previously resulted in U.S. tariff processing suspensions since the request for review was submitted on November 19, 2025. The case arose from an October 20, 2025 petition filed by the Mexican independent union SINTTIA alleging workers' rights denials.
NYSHEX Freight Index Shows Divergent Trends for US Coasts in Weekly Update
According to the container shipping market update on August 24, 2026, the NYSHEX Freight Index (NYFI) registered divergent movements for shipments to the United States.
The index increased by 2.0% for container shipments bound for the US West Coast.
It fell by 1.5% for shipments to the US East Coast.
The Containerized Freight Index, which reflects the weekly spot rates for shipping containers from Shanghai to major global ports, traded flat at 3,409.63 points on August 24, 2026.
Once Again, USMCA Is No Match for U.S. Protectionism
An analysis of the USMCA and U.S. protectionism notes that Mexico has experienced a boom in AI computer server exports to the U.S.
Mexico is benefiting from a surge in U.S. imports of AI computer servers. These exports mostly enter duty-free. Mexico recently passed Taiwan to become the number one U.S. source for these servers.
However, Mexico's value-added on these servers is estimated at only 5% to 7%. This helps export numbers but does little to stem unemployment in the automotive sector.
On August 23, 2026, it was reported that Mexico is benefiting from greatly increased AI computer server exports to the U.S.
Borderlands Mexico: Criminal Groups Keep Pressure on Mexican Freight Networks
According to FreightWaves, Mexico's Nuevo León state recorded more than $17 billion in exports under Mexico's IMMEX manufacturing program during the first five months of 2026 (January through May), an 8.9% increase year-over-year compared to the same period a year ago. The figure accounts for 16% of the national IMMEX exports.
The state also ranks first nationally in IMMEX employment with over 401,000 workers as of May 2026, contributing 12.7% of Mexico's national manufacturing GDP, as Gov. Samuel García highlighted. Concurrently, criminal groups are maintaining intense pressure on Mexican highway cargo transport networks, presenting significant safety, theft, and insurance challenges for cross-border freight logistics.
Mexico's National Guard commander, Guillermo Briseño Lobera, projected cargo thefts involving trucking companies to decline 37% in 2026 compared to 6,263 incidents in 2025, with 2,519 cargo thefts recorded so far in 2026. The Balam highway security strategy operating in 12 states helped reduce cargo theft by 37.19% from 2024 to 2025. Major routes reported significant reductions, with the Laredo/Mexico-Querétaro route down 85.7%, the Mexico-Puebla corridor down 90%, and the Mazatlán-Culiacán highway reporting zero incidents.
Mexico's Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection announced on August 15, 2026, that federal authorities arrested three suspects linked to a criminal cell operating along the Federal Highway 150-D corridor connecting Puebla and Veracruz. The criminal cell is accused of cargo theft, express kidnappings of truck drivers, and the corruption of local officials along this major Mexican trucking route.
According to Overhaul's Mexico Q2 2026 Cargo Theft Report, 76% of cargo theft incidents in Mexico involved violence. Guanajuato, Veracruz, San Luis Potosí, Jalisco, Michoacán, and Tlaxcala experienced cargo theft increases. The Center and West regions of Mexico accounted for 77% of all incidents, representing 46% and 31% of reported thefts respectively. The State of Mexico (18%), Puebla (17.9%), and Guanajuato (10.8%) were the three most affected states, with 86.3% of national cargo theft concentrated in 10 states.
Food and beverage shipments were the most frequently targeted category at 30% of thefts, followed by miscellaneous freight (11%), auto parts (9%), construction and industrial products (9%), and fuel (7%). Agro-related thefts, particularly involving fertilizers and pesticides, increased by four percentage points year-over-year, while auto parts theft rose by three percentage points and fuel theft by two percentage points. Additionally, 85% of cargo theft incidents occurred Monday through Friday, with criminal activity peaking between Tuesday and Friday; 31% of incidents occurred between 6 p.m. and midnight, with two major theft windows identified between 3 a.m. and 7 a.m. and between 6 p.m. and 10 p.m.
SCJN Upholds SAT: Global Invoices May Be Required in Inspections
The Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation (SCJN) confirmed that the Tax Administration Service (SAT) has legal powers to conduct inspection visits to establishments and to require the issuance of global Digital Tax Receipts over the Internet (CFDI), also known as global invoices.
The issuance of global invoices without complying with the applicable requirements, or the omission of their issuance, constitutes the punishable infraction provided for in Article 83, fracción VII, of the Federal Tax Code (CFF).
Expert Outlook
Core judgment
The 50 percent Section 338 tariffs the United States placed on approximately $20 billion of Canadian goods, effective 22 August 2026 and citing third-country commercial ties, recast USMCA as optional leverage in the six-year joint review and stand as an explicit wake-up call that Mexico could be next over Chinese supply-chain integration. IMCO's 2025 figures show that for every extra dollar Mexico exported to the United States it imported only 12 cents more from China, contradicting White House transshipment accusations, yet the threat-based negotiation style still raises origin-scrutiny and compliance pressure on China-Mexico FCL flows.
Drivers decoded
After talks collapsed, the United States imposed 50 percent tariffs under Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 on approximately $20 billion of Canadian goods, effective 22 August 2026 at 12:01 a.m. EDT. Presidential Proclamations 11046, 11047 and 11048, delayed by Proclamation 11056, cover previously USMCA-protected products; Washington also sought to limit Canada's third-country commercial agreements.
On 23 August, IMCO director Oscar Ocampo rebutted the 13 August White House report "The Great Transshipment Scam." Mexico's 2025 US exports reached a record $534.9 billion, up 5.8 percent from 2024; for every additional dollar exported to the United States, Mexico imported only 12 additional cents from China, and in machinery and computer equipment every dollar imported from China corresponded to $35 exported to the United States, growth IMCO links to Taiwanese AI investment by Foxconn, Inventec, Pegatron and Wistron.
The US government aims to tighten Chinese supply-line restrictions into North America and extract USMCA-review concessions by treating existing rules as optional. Its leverage is Section 338 authority, joint-review timing, and the threat of extending Canada-style third-country challenges to Mexico. Its mindset is a normalized, threat-based negotiation that ranks decoupling from China above partner predictability; officials argue Canada and Mexico enable Chinese-sourced critical minerals or software to penetrate North American chains.
Chinese exporters and Mexican FCL importers aim to preserve predictable landed costs and USMCA preferential treatment for Chinese-origin FCL while rejecting unfounded transshipment claims. Their leverage is the 2025 evidence of limited China linkage plus Mexico's deeper, less-substitutable US productive integration. They remain highly sensitive to tariff and origin-scrutiny risk.
Chain effects
The Section 338 tariffs on roughly $20 billion of Canadian goods, citing third-country agreements and collapsing USMCA protections, are the first-order shock. Analysts including Valeria Moy have explicitly warned that Mexico, which holds FTAs with the UK, the EU, EFTA, Japan, CPTPP and Pacific Alliance members, faces parallel targeting on those agreements and on China-linked supply chains in the joint review. The third-order effect is elevated rules-of-origin and compliance-scrutiny pressure on Chinese-sourced FCL imports into Mexico.
The White House "Great Transshipment Scam" accusations are the first-order charge. IMCO's data rebuttal, showing limited China-import linkage relative to US-export growth, is the second-order counter. Political-cycle uncertainty then keeps origin documentation and SAT/ANAM verification risk elevated for China-Mexico FCL even without new duties.
There is no clear winner this period: the joint review is unresolved and the data rebuttal has not lifted origin-compliance friction on China-Mexico FCL.
Scenarios and signposts
The US 50 percent tariffs on Canadian goods took effect on 22 August 2026 at 12:01 a.m. EDT. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has announced dollar-for-dollar retaliatory tariffs, equivalent to the US action on approximately $20 billion of goods, set to start on 8 September 2026.
It remains open whether USMCA joint-review statements or drafts specifically reference Chinese critical minerals, software, or third-country FTA limits on Mexico.
It remains open whether the Mexican government, SE, or ANAM/SAT issues a formal response to the White House report.
It remains open whether Washington contemplates Section 338 or equivalent action against Mexican goods linked to China or Mexico's other FTAs.
It remains open what remaining implementation details of Canada's 8 September 2026 retaliation will show, and whether North American spillover rhetoric appears.
It remains open whether Mexican customs origin-verification intensity or CFDI and global-invoice demands on China-origin FCL change.
Baseline, highly likely, if joint-review talks and White House pressure continue without a formal Section 338 extension to Mexico: USMCA rhetoric on Chinese supply chains continues without immediate new Mexico-specific tariffs, and China-Mexico FCL faces rising origin-documentation and SAT verification friction but stable base duties.
Optimistic, may, if the United States accepts IMCO-style metrics or Mexico and Canada coordinate pushback on third-country challenges: data rebuttals and Mexico's deeper US integration lead to de-escalation of transshipment claims, the compliance burden remains routine, and landed-cost predictability holds.
Pessimistic, unlikely, if USMCA review talks break down or a new White House action mirrors the Canada Section 338 precedent: the United States extends Canada-style third-country or China-linkage restrictions toward Mexico, and China-origin FCL into Mexico sees sharp compliance-cost and clearance-time pressure.
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